Post by gallito on Sept 25, 2015 16:17:31 GMT -5
TIME was when, conceptually at least, ending guerrilla wars was fairly straightforward. In return for demobilising, insurgents would get an amnesty and, if they were lucky, political reforms or even a hand in writing a new constitution. That, broadly speaking, was what happened in the Central American peace deals of the 1990s and with Colombia’s M-19 rebels.
But international law has evolved since then. Nowadays blanket amnesties that grant impunity for crimes against humanity are frowned upon. And such crimes are increasingly broadly drawn: as well as massacres they include the abduction and forced displacement of civilians.
For years Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have engaged in such practices. For this reason, peace talks between Colombia’s government and the FARC—by far the largest surviving insurgency in Latin America, with some 6,000 fighters—have been more drawn-out than many had hoped. Held in Havana, they began almost three years ago. After accords were reached on the first three items of a six-point agenda—on rural development, political participation and curbing drugs-smuggling—the negotiations became bogged down in mid-2014 on the crucial issue of transitional justice, or what penalties guerrilla commanders accused of crimes against humanity should face.
This deadlock came close to causing the talks to collapse earlier this year. In April the FARC broke its own unilateral ceasefire when one of its units in the southern department of Cauca killed 11 soldiers, triggering national outrage and tit-for-tat attacks. In early July Colombia’s president, Juan Manuel Santos, called the FARC’s bluff. He demanded that the talks speed up, saying that he would evaluate in November whether or not they were worth continuing.
The gambit worked. On September 23rd Mr Santos flew to Havana and together with Timoleón Jiménez, the FARC’s top commander, announced an agreement on justice. The pair said they hoped to sign a final peace accord within six months.
While the rank-and-file of the FARC’s fighters will receive amnesties, leaders charged with “the most serious and representative” crimes will face a special tribunal, containing a minority of foreign judges. Those who confess and collaborate with a truth commission will benefit from alternative penalties: between five and eight years of community work “with effective restriction of liberty”, though not in prison conditions. Those who do not collaborate will go to jail for up to 20 years. Similar procedures will apply to the armed forces and those found guilty of financing right-wing paramilitary vigilantes.
The FARC have long insisted that no guerrilla movement in Latin America has even given up its fight in order to go to jail. That is a fate they may have avoided, but they have accepted a tougher regime than many expected (provided it is properly enforced). And they have agreed that they will only enjoy its benefits if they have given up their weapons.
As for Mr Santos, he has always said he wanted “the maximum amount of justice that allows us to have peace”. Has he got that? Most lawyers will say the agreement is in line with international law. It holds the FARC legally accountable for their crimes. But it is less stringent than many Colombians would like. In polls more than 90% of them say the FARC should serve jail time. That has been the view of Álvaro Uribe, Mr Santos’s predecessor and now his chief political foe.
Yet many will conclude that an imperfect deal is better than none at all. Armed conflict imposes a heavy burden in loss of life and lawlessness. The total cost of violence in Colombia, including lost output and productivity as well as security spending, is equal to 18% of its GDP each year, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace, an international NGO.
The negotiators’ next task is to approve arrangements for the FARC to demobilise and give up their weapons. They have agreed to start this process within 60 days of the final agreement. To be credible, it will require robust international verification and monitoring.
It will be a while before peace starts to become a reality. The ELN, a smaller guerrilla group, is engaged in talks about talks, but could remain a violent irritant. All being well, by June Congress will approve a constitutional amendment that would endow the government with the powers needed to implement a deal with the FARC. Mr Santos has promised that Colombians will get a chance to approve or reject the final agreement. But September 23rd marks a turning point. For the first time in half a century, peace with the FARC now looks inevitable.
But international law has evolved since then. Nowadays blanket amnesties that grant impunity for crimes against humanity are frowned upon. And such crimes are increasingly broadly drawn: as well as massacres they include the abduction and forced displacement of civilians.
For years Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have engaged in such practices. For this reason, peace talks between Colombia’s government and the FARC—by far the largest surviving insurgency in Latin America, with some 6,000 fighters—have been more drawn-out than many had hoped. Held in Havana, they began almost three years ago. After accords were reached on the first three items of a six-point agenda—on rural development, political participation and curbing drugs-smuggling—the negotiations became bogged down in mid-2014 on the crucial issue of transitional justice, or what penalties guerrilla commanders accused of crimes against humanity should face.
This deadlock came close to causing the talks to collapse earlier this year. In April the FARC broke its own unilateral ceasefire when one of its units in the southern department of Cauca killed 11 soldiers, triggering national outrage and tit-for-tat attacks. In early July Colombia’s president, Juan Manuel Santos, called the FARC’s bluff. He demanded that the talks speed up, saying that he would evaluate in November whether or not they were worth continuing.
The gambit worked. On September 23rd Mr Santos flew to Havana and together with Timoleón Jiménez, the FARC’s top commander, announced an agreement on justice. The pair said they hoped to sign a final peace accord within six months.
While the rank-and-file of the FARC’s fighters will receive amnesties, leaders charged with “the most serious and representative” crimes will face a special tribunal, containing a minority of foreign judges. Those who confess and collaborate with a truth commission will benefit from alternative penalties: between five and eight years of community work “with effective restriction of liberty”, though not in prison conditions. Those who do not collaborate will go to jail for up to 20 years. Similar procedures will apply to the armed forces and those found guilty of financing right-wing paramilitary vigilantes.
The FARC have long insisted that no guerrilla movement in Latin America has even given up its fight in order to go to jail. That is a fate they may have avoided, but they have accepted a tougher regime than many expected (provided it is properly enforced). And they have agreed that they will only enjoy its benefits if they have given up their weapons.
As for Mr Santos, he has always said he wanted “the maximum amount of justice that allows us to have peace”. Has he got that? Most lawyers will say the agreement is in line with international law. It holds the FARC legally accountable for their crimes. But it is less stringent than many Colombians would like. In polls more than 90% of them say the FARC should serve jail time. That has been the view of Álvaro Uribe, Mr Santos’s predecessor and now his chief political foe.
Yet many will conclude that an imperfect deal is better than none at all. Armed conflict imposes a heavy burden in loss of life and lawlessness. The total cost of violence in Colombia, including lost output and productivity as well as security spending, is equal to 18% of its GDP each year, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace, an international NGO.
The negotiators’ next task is to approve arrangements for the FARC to demobilise and give up their weapons. They have agreed to start this process within 60 days of the final agreement. To be credible, it will require robust international verification and monitoring.
It will be a while before peace starts to become a reality. The ELN, a smaller guerrilla group, is engaged in talks about talks, but could remain a violent irritant. All being well, by June Congress will approve a constitutional amendment that would endow the government with the powers needed to implement a deal with the FARC. Mr Santos has promised that Colombians will get a chance to approve or reject the final agreement. But September 23rd marks a turning point. For the first time in half a century, peace with the FARC now looks inevitable.